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FOREWORD
LEE

C.

BOLLINGER*

The mass media are too important to American democracy, too capable of causing injury, and too easy a target for the
perennial wish to find a scapegoat for the country's ills ever to
be very far from the center of public attention and debate.
That is certainly true today. And, though every generation
probably thinks that it stands at a crossroads on the question
what to do with the media, I would nevertheless venture to say
that the issues of our time are more serious, and more complex, than ever before. One can safely predict, in any event,
that we are entering another significant period of reflection and
reassessment with respect to the concept of freedom of the
press and to the performance of the press under that concept.
The end of a century, however irrationally, seems naturally to
induce a self-reflective frame of mind. At mid-century we had
the famous Hutchins' Commission "Report on a Free and
Responsible Press," with its powerful critique of American
journalism; so now we might expect an equivalent commission
to close the century and to ask whether all's well with our system of mass communications. All things considered, such a
general review would probably be all to the good.
Three areas for study would seem to demand attention.
The first involves a simple assessment of the performance of
the press-that is, the need to identify and, when possible,
measure what the press does well and what it does poorly. The
second area for study involves asking what role public regulation can effectively play in encouraging good journalism and
discouraging abuses. The third involves deciding what limits
the First Amendment to the Constitution places on any role for
public regulation.
During the course of the last half century, enormously
important developments have occurred in each of these areas.
Empirical studies of the press, ranging from inquiries into the
effects of violent programming on social behavior to inquiries
into how the methods of news reporting shape the character of
public debate and voting, have proliferated since the Second
World War. Professor Shanto Iyengar has been a leader in this
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field and his article in this volume, "How Television News
Affects Voters: From Setting Agendas to Defining Standards,"
is representative of that important work. We have come a considerable distance from the mostly anecdotal evidence relied
upon by the Hutchins' Commission.
As for the potential role of public regulation of the press,
we also now have a deep reservoir of experience from which to
gather data and draw conclusions. Libel law, for example, continues to protect individual reputation, while privacy law protects individuals against unauthorized disclosure of highly
embarrassing (and true) information. But the Fairness Doctrine, the equal time rule and related public access regulations
for the electronic media of television and radio have opened a
whole new chapter on the subject of the role public institutions
might play in minimizing distortions and equalizing opportunities for participation in public debate. Professor Don Le Duc's
article here, "Recognizing the Interests of the Public in Broadcasting Programming," speaks effectively to the issue of
whether these sorts of regulations are necessary to correct deficiencies in a pure "marketplace" solution.
Finally, with respect to the constitutional question of the
scope of permissible regulatory intervention into the media, we
now have a rich and extensive jurisprudence of cases and scholarship, ripe for review and reassessment. Virtually every year,
the Supreme Court adds yet another decision or two to this
ever-growing body of case law now so sizeable in fact that it has
become commonplace for law schools throughout the country
to offer separate courses in mass media or communications law,
with a heavy emphasis on the role of the First Amendment in
defining the boundaries of media regulation.
Ever since New York Times v. Sullivan, in 1964, the Supreme
Court has been actively at work constructing the constitutional
principle of freedom of the press. One of the most remarkable
areas within this jurisprudence is the differential system of constitutional principles applicable to the print media on the one
hand and the electronic media on the other. In a series of decisions that remain valid to this day, the Court has denied the
government any constitutional authority to create and enforce
public access rules for print while permitting the state to
impose such rules in the context of the broadcast media. This
extraordinary regime has been the subject of intense debate
over the past two decades. Jonathan Emord's article here,
"The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Content Regulations," argues forcefully that the regime lacks constitutional
legitimacy and that the principles applicable to the print media
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should reign for the electronic sector as well. That puts him
squarely in the middle of a difficult and perplexing debate
about the role of government in overseeing the development of
new technologies of communication.
Now, each of these areas of inquiry-assessing the performance of the press, devising effective public regulations,
and determining the constitutional limits of public regulationare important and worthy of study in themselves. But it is vital
that they be seen not as discrete but as interactive and dynamic.
Determining the media's shortcomings is, of course, essential
to devising public regulations and deciding how much latitude
there should be for public institutions to intervene. But the
process of constitutional adjudication also necessarily involves
defining the role of the media in American society and identifying the goals of freedom of the press. And, as this occurs, the
standards by which the performance of the press will be measured and problems identified are affected too.
One of the most interesting developments in constitUtional law has been the creation of a complex relationship
between the Supreme Court (or courts generally) and the
media. In its annual decisions about the First Amendment
rights of the press, the Court has opportunities, in effect, to
supervise and critique the institution of the press. One interesting question is whether this now fixed process of review
induces the press to live up to the role envisioned by the Court
(perhaps in hopes of better persuading the Court that the press
is worthy of the freedoms it has or seeks) or actually discourages self-regulation (out of fear that self-regulation implies a
recognition of problems within the press and, by extension, a
need for regulation). Professor Robert Drechsel's very interesting article, "Media Ethics and Media Law: The Transformation of Moral Obligation into Legal Principle," helpfully
explores this issue.
Equally important are the ways in which the effectiveness
of the public regulations we devise affect the constitutional
norms about what is permissible and impermissible intervention. The benefits one can hope to achieve by regulation, and
at what costs, shape our general conceptions of what's possible
and therefore what's constitutionally allowable. And yet we
often do not really know what those benefits and costs are until
regulation has been tried. It is, I think, at least partly for that
reason that new technologies of communication have beenperhaps even justifiably-treated differently in terms of public
regulation and of First Amendment law. New media sometimes
seem to be laboratories for new forms of public regulation,
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helping prepare the way for the future as circumstances
change. Professor Ethan Katsh and Professor Janet Rifkin, in
their article, "The New Media and A New Model of Conflict
Resolution: Copying, Copyright, and Creating," propose, in
this general spirit, a new copyright scheme for creative work in
the new electronic age.
Touching on each of the major questions of contemporary
media regulation and law, the articles in this volume are most
welcome contributions.

